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Abstract
This study explores how agricultural technology a¤ects the endogenous takeo¤ of
an economy in the Schumpeterian growth model. Due to the subsistence requirement
for agricultural consumption, an improvement in agricultural technology reallocates
labor from agriculture to the industrial sector. Therefore, agricultural improvement
expands the rm size in the industrial sector, which determines innovation and triggers
an endogenous transition from stagnation to growth. Calibrating the model to data,
we nd that without the reallocation of labor from agriculture to the industrial sector
in the early 19th century, the takeo¤ of the US economy would have been delayed by
about four decades.
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The spectacular industrial revolution would not have been possible without
the agricultural revolution that preceded it. [...] The introduction of the turnip
[...] made possible a change in crop rotation which [...] brought about a tremen-
dous rise in agricultural productivity. As a result, more food could be grown
with much less manpower. Manpower was released for capital construction. The
growth of industry would not have been possible without the turnip and other
improvements in agriculture. Nurkse (1953, p. 52-53)
1 Introduction
According to Nurkse (1953), among many others, improvements in agricultural technology
that released labor from agriculture were crucial for the industrial revolution. The industrial
revolution in turn sparked the great divergence (Pomeranz 2001) and centuries of sustained
economic growth. History thus suggests that improvements in agricultural technology propa-
gate pervasively throughout the economy and have momentous consequences that far exceed
what one can see by looking at the sector in isolation.
Modern growth economics has investigated extensively the forces driving the process,
typically building on the theory of endogenous technological change (Romer 1990). Since
at its core the theory has dynamic increasing returns, it identies the size of the market
in which rms operate as a, if not the, crucial factor determining incentives to innovate. A
spectacular application of these ideas is the Unied Growth Theory of Galor and Weil (2000);
see also Galor (2005, 2011). Models in this tradition produce an endogenous takeo¤ and a
transition from stagnation to growth. Following these two inuential branches of growth
economics, and to place industry solidly at the forefront of the analysis, Peretto (2015) has
developed an IO-based Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous takeo¤ in which rm
size determines the incentives to innovate; see, e.g., Cohen and Klepper (1996a, b) and
Laincz and Peretto (2006) for evidence on this channel. We use this model to formalize
Nurkses idea and then investigate the role that agriculture plays in shaping the growth path
of the economy. This strikes us as a rst-order question in light of studies like, among others,
Lagakos and Waugh (2013) that document large and persistent productivity di¤erences in
agriculture across countries.
In the baseline Schumpeterian model rm size is increasing in population size and de-
creasing in the number of rms. All else equal, a larger population causes an earlier transition
from stagnation to growth. However, countries with large population, such as China and
India, did not experience an early industrial takeo¤, arguably because the vast majority
of their population was in agriculture and thus not contributing to rm size in industry.
To capture this idea we introduce an agricultural sector and investigate how it a¤ects the
takeo¤ and the subsequent growth pattern. We preserve the analytical tractability of the
original model and derive a closed-form solution for the equilibrium growth rate throughout
the entire transition from stagnation to balanced growth. We nd that higher agricultural
productivity causes an earlier takeo¤ with faster post-takeo¤ growth and nal convergence
to scale-invariant growth.
At the heart of the mechanism driving this result is a subsistence requirement for agricul-
tural consumption, which yields that when agricultural productivity improves labor moves
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from agriculture to industry. This reallocation alone can be su¢cient to ignite industrializa-
tion. More generally, we have that: (i) for given agricultural technology, the model predicts
a nite takeo¤ date with an associated wait time that is co-determined by initial rm size
and decreasing in agricultural productivity; (ii) for given rm size, the model identies the
minimum size of the improvement in agricultural technologyan Agricultural Revolution
that triggers an immediate Industrial Revolution. The combination of (i) and (ii) says
that low agricultural productivity delays industrialization and creates a temporary drag on
post-industrialization growth. The drag is only temporary and not permanent because our
Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous market structure sterilizes the scale e¤ect.
These properties provide a new lens for interpreting the empirical evidence. As men-
tioned, economies with large populations (e.g., China, India) failed to industrialize for
decades after smaller ones did (e.g., UK, USA). Growth theories based on increasing returns
have problems explaining this fact. The typical argument is that they had bad institutions
(e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Our analysis develops the complementary hypothesis
that their large, relatively unproductive agricultural sectors played an important role in de-
termining their industrialization lags. Moreover, the scale-invariance of steady-state growth
implies that while agricultural productivity does not a¤ect income growth asymptotically, it
has permanent and large e¤ects on the overall time-prole of income. This property sheds
new light on the debate about the role that agriculture (more generally, the primary sector)
plays in shaping the dynamics of cross-country income di¤erences.
We calibrate the model to US data to perform an illustrative quantitative analysis. The
agricultural share of the US workforce was about 80% in the early 19th century (see Baten
2016) and decreased to about 70% in 1830 and 60% in 1840 (see Lebergott 1966 and Weiss
1986). We nd that this reallocation of labor from agriculture to industry was a powerful
push toward the takeo¤ of the US economy. In line with our analytical result, absent this
reallocation the takeo¤ of the US economy would have occurred four decades later. Finally,
we derive a formula that shows that a one-fth increase in industrial employment reduces
the wait time to takeo¤ by about a decade.
This study relates to the literature on endogenous technological change. Romer (1990)
develops the rst R&D-based growth model driven by the invention of new products (horizon-
tal innovation). Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom
et al. (1990) develop the creative-destruction Schumpeterian growth model driven by the
improvement of the quality of products (vertical innovation). Peretto (1994, 1998, 1999),
Smulders (1994), and Smulders and van de Klundert (1995) combine the two dimensions of
innovation to develop the creative-accumulation Schumpeterian growth model with endoge-
nous market structure.1 We contribute to this literature by incorporating an agricultural
sector in the creative-accumulation model. We nd that the scale-invariance property arising
from the two dimensions of innovation is important in allowing the allocation of resources
to a¤ect the endogenous takeo¤ but not economic growth in the long run.
This study also relates to the literature on endogenous takeo¤. The seminal study in this
literature is Galor and Weil (2000) that develops unied growth theory, which shows that
1Laincz and Peretto (2006), Ha and Howitt (2007), Madsen (2008, 2010) and Ang and Madsen (2011)
provide early evidence for this class of models. Garcia-Macia et al. (2019) provide the latest evidence that
growth is driven by the in-house innovation activity of existing rms. Howitt (1999) combines the two
dimensions of technology to develop a creative-destruction version of the theory.
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the quality-quantity trade-o¤ in childrearing and the accumulation of human capital enable
an economy to escape the Malthusian trap and experience an endogenous transition from
stagnation to growth.2 We focus, instead, on the role of Schumpeterian technological progress
as a complementary channel for the endogenous takeo¤ of the economy. More generally, and
in line with the overall thrust of this literature, we formalize the idea of Nurkse (1953),
and the related big push idea of Murphy et al. (1989), in a very tractable dynamic general
equilibrium model that allows us to obtain analytical results and then quantify the e¤ects of
agricultural technology on the industrialization path of the economya path consisting of
an endogenous takeo¤ followed by post-takeo¤ accelerating growth, with nal convergence
from below to scale-invariant innovation-led steady-state growth.
2 A Schumpeterian model of endogenous takeo¤
The model features both improvement of existing intermediate goods (vertical innovation)
and creation of new intermediate goods (horizontal innovation). Incentives to undertake
these activities depend on rm size. Consequently, whether the economy experiences the
endogenous takeo¤ depends on the size of the market for intermediate goods. In the original
version (Peretto, 2015) the size of this market is proportional to the size of the labor force.
By incorporating an agricultural sector with subsistence consumption, we disentangle the
size of the market for intermediate goods from the size of the labor force and obtain a
structure where the size of the intermediate sector, and therefore the size of intermediate
rms, depends on the reallocation of labor from agriculture.
2.1 Household
There is a representative household with Lt = L0e
t identical members, where L0 = 1 and
 > 0 is population growth rate. The household has Stone-Geary preferences
U0 =
Z
1
0
e ( )t [ln ct +  ln(qt   )] dt; (1)
where ct and qt denote, respectively, consumption per capita of an industrial and of an agri-
cultural good. The parameter  > 0 determines the importance of industrial consumption
relative to agricultural consumption. The latter features a subsistence requirement  > 0.3
The parameter  >  is the subjective discount rate.
The household maximizes utility subject to the asset-accumulation equation
_at = (rt   )at + wt   ct   ptqt; (2)
2See also Galor and Moav (2002), Galor and Mountford (2008), Galor et al. (2009) and Ashraf and Galor
(2011). Galor (2011) provides a comprehensive review of unied growth theory.
3This is a common feature of structural change models (see, e.g., Matsuyama (1992), Laitner (2000) and
Kongsamut et al. (2001)), which study the implications of structural change for long-run (i.e., asymptotic)
growth but not for endogenous takeo¤. See Herrendorf et al. (2014) for an excellent survey of this literature
and Herrendorf et al. (2020) for a recent contribution.
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where at is wealth per capita and rt is the real interest rate. Each member of the household
supplies inelastically one unit of labor to earn the wage wt. Let the industrial good be our
numeraire and pt be the price of the agricultural good. The household sets:
_ct
ct
= rt   ; (3)
qt =  +
ct
pt
: (4)
The rst equation summarizes the intertemporal consumption-saving decision as the growth
path of industrial consumption ct. The second summarizes the intratemporal allocation of
expenditure across the two goods as the demand for agricultural consumption qt.
2.2 Agriculture
We follow Lagakos andWaugh (2013) and model agriculture as a competitive sector operating
a linear technology
Qt = ALq;t; (5)
where the parameter A >  is labor productivity and Lq;t is employment in agriculture.
Prot maximization yields
wt = ptA; (6)
which says that the wage in agriculture is equal to the marginal product of labor.
We omit land for simplicity. Including land produces the same qualitative results about
endogenous takeo¤s but the analysis is much more algebra-intensive. Vollrath (2011), among
many others, studies the e¤ects of land intensity and labor intensity in agriculture on indus-
trialization. Our results are in line with the general insights produced by that work.
2.3 Industrial production
A representative competitive rm operates the assembly technology
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xt (i)

Zt (i)Z
1 
t Ly;t=N
1 
t
1 
di, (7)
where f; ; g 2 (0; 1). The key features are: (i) there is a continuum of non-durable
di¤erentiated intermediate goods i 2 [0; Nt]; (ii) Xt (i) is the quantity of intermediate good
i; (iii) the productivity of good i depends on its own quality Zt (i) and on average quality
Zt 
R Nt
0
Zt (j) dj=Nt; (iv) overall productivity in assembly depends on product variety Nt.
Two parameters regulate technological spillovers:  captures the private return to quality
and hence 1    determines vertical technological spillovers; 1    captures a congestion
e¤ect of product variety so that the social return to variety is .
Let Pt (i) be the price of Xt (i). Prot maximization yields the conditional demands:
Ly;t = (1  )
Yt
wt
; (8)
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Xt (i) =


Pt (i)
1=(1 )
Zt (i)Z
1 
t Ly;t
N1 t
: (9)
These expressions yield that the competitive industrial rm pays (1  )Yt = wtLy;t for
industrial labor and Yt =
R Nt
0
Pt (i)Xt (i) di for intermediate goods.
2.4 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
A monopolistic rm produces di¤erentiated intermediate good i with a linear technology
that requires Xt (i) units of the industrial good to produce Xt (i) units of intermediate good
i at quality Zt (i), that is, the marginal cost of production is one. The rm also pays
Zt (i)Z
1 
t units of the industrial good as a xed operating cost. To improve the quality
of its product, the rm devotes It (i) units of the industrial good to in-house R&D. The
innovation technology is
_Zt (i) = It (i) . (10)
The rms gross prot (i.e., prot before-R&D) is
t (i) = [Pt (i)  1]Xt (i)  Z

t (i)Z
1 
t . (11)
The value of the monopolistic rm is
Vt (i) =
Z
1
t
exp

 
Z s
t
rudu

[s (i)  Is (i)] ds. (12)
The monopolistic rm maximizes (12) subject to (9) and (10).
We solve this dynamic optimization problem in Appendix A and nd that the uncon-
strained prot-maximizing markup ratio is 1=. However, we assume that competitive fringe
rms can produce Xt(i) at quality Zt(i) but at the higher marginal cost  2 (1; 1=).
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monopolistic rm then sets
Pt(i) = min f; 1=g =  (13)
and prices fringe rms out of the market. The optimization problem also delivers the rms
rate of return to innovation,
rqt (i) = 
t (i)
Zt (i)
= 

(  1)
Xt (i)
Zt (i)
  Z 1t (i)Z
1 
t

;
which is linear in quality-adjusted rm size Xt (i) =Zt (i). This property is at the heart of
the mechanism that we study: incentives to innovate depend on quality-adjusted rm size,
which in turn depends on the size of the market. We now turn to this component of the
logical chain.
In models of this class the equilibrium of the market for intermediate goods is symmetric,
that is, intermediate rms start with the same initial quality Z0 (i) = Z0 for i 2 [0; Nt] and,
facing a symmetric environment, make identical decisions. Consequently, they grow at the
4Specically, we allow for di¤usion of knowledge from monopolistic rms to fringe rms that enables
the latter to constrain the pricing behavior of the former. This structure disentangles markups from the
technological parameter .
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same rate and symmetry holds at any point in time. Using the limit price (13), quality-
adjusted rm size is
Xt (i)
Zt (i)
=
Xt
Zt
=



1=(1 )
Ly;t
N1 t
=



1=(1 )
Lt
N1 t
Ly;t
Lt
:
We dene the industrial employment share ly;t  Ly;t=Lt and the composite variable
xt  
1=(1 ) Lt
N1 t
: (14)
This variable compresses the two state variables Lt (population) and Nt (mass of rms) to
the ratio Lt=N
1 
t and, therefore, makes the analysis of the models dynamics simple.
With this notation, quality-adjusted rm size becomes
Xt
Zt
=



1=(1 )
xt
1=(1 )
Ly;t
Lt
=
xtly;t
1=(1 )
:
Accordingly, the rate of return to innovation is
rqt = 
t
Zt
= 

  1
1=(1 )
xtly;t   

: (15)
To summarize, this structure captures two sides of the idea explored in this paper. First,
agricultural employment implies ly;t < 1 and thus reduces rm size in the intermediate
sector and thereby depresses incentives to innovate. Second, the reallocation of labor from
agriculture to industrial production is an essential component of the dynamics of takeo¤ and
subsequent sustained growth: as ly;t rises, the return to innovation rises faster than in the
absence of structural change.
2.5 Entrants
Upon payment of a sunk cost of Xt,  > 0, units of the industrial good, a new rm enters
the market and o¤ers a new di¤erentiated good of average quality. This structure preserves
the symmetry of the intermediate goods market equilibrium at all times. The asset-pricing
equation governing the value of rms (old and new) is
rt =
t   It
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
. (16)
Entry is positive when the free-entry condition holds, i.e., when
Vt = Xt: (17)
Substituting (9) and (13) in (11) and then using the resulting expression, (10), (16) and (17)
yield the return to entry as
ret =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
 
+ zt
xtly;t

+ zt +
_xt
xt
+
_ly;t
ly;t
; (18)
where zt  _Zt=Zt is the growth rate of average quality.
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2.6 Aggregation
We dene the general equilibrium in Appendix A. (9) and (13) yield the reduced-form rep-
resentation of industrial production
Yt = (=)
=(1 )Nt ZtLy;t: (19)
The associated growth rate of industrial output per capita, yt = Yt=Lt, is
gt 
_yt
yt
= nt + zt +
_ly;t
ly;t
: (20)
This growth rate has three components: (i) the growth rate of the variety of intermediate
goods, nt  _Nt=Nt; (ii) the growth rate of the average quality of intermediate goods, zt; (iii)
the growth rate of the industrial labor share ly;t.
2.7 Labor allocation
The combination of labor demand from agriculture (6) and industry (8) yields
pt =
(1  )Yt
ALy;t
: (21)
Substituting the agricultural technology (5) and the relative price (21) in the demand func-
tion for qt in (4) yields the industrial labor share ly;t as
ly;t =

1 +

1  
ct
yt

 1 
1 

A

: (22)
This equation says that for given consumption-output ratio ct=yt, the industrial labor share
ly;t is increasing in A if and only if  > 0. This property produces sectoral reallocation
whereby an improvement in the agricultural technology releases labor from agriculture to
the industrial sector.
3 Agriculture, takeo¤ and long-run growth
We now develop the main insight of the paper. We rst show that the economy begins in a
pre-industrial era in which the growth rate of industrial output per capita is zero. It then
enters the industrial era, which consists of two phases. In the rst, only the development of
new products marketed by new rms drives the growth rate of industrial output per capita.
In the second, product-quality improvement by existing rms adds its contribution and
produces an acceleration of the growth rate.5 The economy nally converges to a balanced
growth path that features constant growth of income per capita fueled by both vertical and
horizontal innovation.
5We consider the realistic case in which product creation happens before quality improvement. See Peretto
(2015) for details on this property of the baseline growth model.
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Next, we show that agriculture shapes this process of phase transitions and convergence:
agricultural productivity determines the timing of the rst phase transition, the endogenous
takeo¤ of the economy, and of the second phase transition, the activation of vertical inno-
vation. This timing e¤ect has momentous consequences: although agricultural productivity
does not a¤ect steady-state growth due to the models sterilization of the scale e¤ect, it has
permanent and large e¤ects on the economys time-prole of income. This property sheds
new light on the debate about the role that agriculture plays in shaping the dynamics of
cross-country income di¤erences.
3.1 The models global dynamics
The equilibrium law of motion of the state variable xt is
_xt = [  (1  )nt]xt; (23)
where the entry rate nt is either zero or an increasing function of xt (see Appendix A). The
process is thus initially explosive and then becomes implosive. It converges to the balanced
growth path if the following condition holds
 >
1


  1  

+

1  


>   1: (24)
Specically, the state variable xt converges to
x = 1=(1 )
(1  )  [+ =(1  )]
(1  )(  1)   [+ =(1  )]
1 + 

1 +  


1 

 
1  
A

as the growth rate of product variety converges to n = =(1   ). Steady-state rm size
and income per capita growth are:
xly = 
1=(1 ) (1  )  [+ =(1  )]
(1  )(  1)   [+ =(1  )]
; (25)
g = 

(  1)
(1  )  [+ =(1  )]
(1  )(  1)   [+ =(1  )]
  

   > 0: (26)
This structure has two properties worth stressing.
First, the existence condition (24) consists of two inequalities that ensure that the steady
state x exists. To establish whether it is the attractor of the models dynamics, we need to
investigate the conditions for the occurrence of the two phase transitions discussed above.
We do so in the remainder of this section, placing the role of agriculture at the center of
the investigation. The exercise shows that the two inequalities also provide the condition for
the occurrence of the second phase transition. The two conditions in (24) are then jointly
su¢cient for the full transition to the steady state x.
Second, (26) says that steady-state growth is independent of the sectoral allocation of
labor due to the scale-invariance of the Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous market
structure. This property is central to the papers insight. As we investigate the role of
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agriculture in driving the phase transitions, we nd that because steady-state growth is
invariant to A, cross-country di¤erences in agricultural technology produce a pattern of
divergence-convergence, namely: (i) di¤erences in A generate di¤erences in growth that are
solely due to di¤erences in the timing of takeo¤; (ii) such di¤erences are only temporary
and eventually vanish so that all else equal there is long-run growth equalization. It is
worth stressing that di¤erences in growth rates vanish, not di¤erences in income levels.
That is, di¤erences in agricultural productivity imprint themselves on income levels and are
amplied by the initial divergence in income dynamics caused by the di¤erent takeo¤ times.
The amplication can be large since it leverages di¤erences in growth rates that last several
decades due to the models slow convergence to the steady state.
3.2 The pre-industrial era
In the pre-industrial era rm size xtly;t is small and there are two possible congurations of
the intermediate-good sector. First, initially demand for each intermediate good is so small
that a would-be monopolist operating the increasing-returns technology would earn negative
prot (see Appendix A for details). Since the increasing-returns technology is not viable, the
existing N0 intermediate goods are produced by competitive rms that do not innovate and
make zero prot at the equilibrium price Pt(i) = . Anticipating this, entrepreneurs are not
willing to pay the sunk entry cost and thus there is no variety innovation either. Initially,
therefore, all technologies in this economy exhibit constant returns to scale and rm size
grows only because of exogenous population growth.
The second possible conguration occurs when the size of the market for intermediate
goods grows su¢ciently large that a would-be monopolist operating the increasing-returns
technology could earn positive prot. We assume, however, that although the increasing-
returns technology is now viable agents do not deploy it yet because doing so requires pay-
ment of the sunk entry cost.6 The idea is that only innovation, in this case a process inno-
vation, allows a new rm to monopolize an existing market. Hence, the pre-industrial era
ends only when the present value of monoplistic rms is su¢ciently large that the free-entry
condition (17) holds.
As a result of the pre-industrial market structure outlined above, in the pre-industrial
era the households industrial consumption is ct = wtly;t = (1  )yt, which yields
ct
yt
= 1  : (27)
Substituting this result in (22) yields
ly =
1
1 + 

1 

A

: (28)
This says that the industrial labor share in the pre-industrial era is stationary and increasing
in agricultural productivity A. The associated growth rate of industrial output per capita is
gt = nt + zt +
_ly;t
ly;t
= 0 (29)
6In Appendix B, we consider an extension of the model that does not rely on this assumption and show
that the dynamics are less realistic.
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because nt = zt = _ly;t=ly;t = 0.
3.3 The industrial era: phase 1
Horizontal innovation (but not yet vertical innovation) activates when rm size xtly;t grows
su¢ciently large. To see this, note that when the free-entry condition holds the consumption-
output ratio ct=yt and the industrial labor share ly;t jump to the steady-state values (deriva-
tion in Appendix A): 
c
y


=
(  )

+ 1  ; (30)
ly =
1
1 + 

1 +  


1 
 1  
A

: (31)
The growth rate of product variety is (derivation in Appendix A)
nt =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
 

xtly

+    > 0; (32)
which is positive if
xt >
h
1 + 

1 +  


1 
i
1=(1 )
  1  (  )

1 

A

 1
 xN : (33)
Note that nt is increasing in the agricultural technology A via the industrial labor share
ly, which is increasing in A, and increasing in the state variable xt so that (23) describes a
stable process. The growth rate of industrial output per capita is gt = nt.
The interpretation of this property in terms of the baseline growth model is that there
exists a threshold of xt below which the economy operates under pre-industrial conditions
and rm size grows only because of exogenous population growth. Eventually, the economy
crosses the threshold xN but it takes
TN =
1

log

xN
x0

(34)
years to achieve such takeo¤ (derivation in Appendix A). Since xN is decreasing in A, the
combination of (32) and (34) says that economies with higher agricultural productivity A
take o¤ earlier and exhibit faster post-takeo¤ growth than economies with lower A.
An alternative interpretation is as follows. We write (33) as
A >

1  1
 1 ( )
h
1 + 

1 +  


1 
i
1=(1 )=xt
: (35)
This now says that, given xt, when the agricultural technology A is below this critical thresh-
old the economy remains in the pre-industrial equilibrium. However, if A rises above the
threshold, the economy takes o¤ immediately. In this sense, we have a condition determining
when and how an Agricultural Revolution can trigger the Industrial Revolution. The two
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interpretations are complementary. The rst holds A constant and uses the models dynam-
ics to compute the wait time to industrialization, i.e., how long it takes for xt to go from
its initial value x0 to the threshold value xN . As shown, the wait time is lower the larger is
A. The second interpretation xes xt and asks how large an improvement in A is needed to
trigger immediately the activation of Schumpeterian innovation. (35) says that economies
with larger rms require smaller agricultural improvements to take o¤.
The important component of this mechanism is that when the agricultural technology im-
proves the economy reallocates labor from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector and
that this reallocation alone can be su¢cient to ignite industrialization. Figure 1 presents the
time path of the growth rate gt when A increases at time t and causes the economy to escape
the pre-industrial era and enter the rst phase of the industrial era. The gure highlights the
two complementary interpretations discussed above: (i) for given A, the model predicts a
nite takeo¤ date with an associated wait time determined by the initial condition x0 (equiv-
alently, initial rm size x0ly); (ii) for given rm size xtl

y, the model identies the minimum
size of the improvement in Aan Agricultural Revolutionthat triggers an immediate In-
dustrial Revolution. The combination of (i) and (ii) says that low agricultural productivity
delays industrialization and creates a temporary drag on post-industrialization growth. The
drag is only temporary because our Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous market
structure sterilizes the scale e¤ect.
Figure 1: Agricultural revolution and industrialization
3.4 The industrial era: phase 2
When rm size xtl

y is su¢ciently large, horizontal and vertical innovation occur simultane-
ously. This is the second phase of the industrial era. Given active horizontal innovation, the
consumption-output ratio and the industrial labor share remain at the steady-state values
(30)-(31). The growth rate (derivation in Appendix A),
gt = 

  1
1=(1 )
xtl

y   

   > 0; (36)
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is increasing in the agricultural technology A via the industrial labor share ly and increasing
in rm size xtl

y. The entry process (derivation in Appendix A) driving the dynamics of xt is
nt =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
 
+ zt
xtly

+    > 0; (37)
where
zt =

1 
1=(1 )
xtly
 1
  1
1=(1 )
xtl

y   
 
 
1=(1 )
xtly

  +  (  )

:
Given (24), this phase transition occurs when
xt >

1 + 

1 +
  


1  




1 

A

 1
 xZ > xN ; (38)
where

  arg solve
!

  1
1=(1 )
!   
 
 
1=(1 )
!

=    (  )

:
As in the previous case, the standard interpretation of this condition is that for given A
there exists a threshold of rm size above which rms invest in-house and growth accelerates
due to quality innovation.
The complementary interpretation of the threshold follows from rewriting (38) as
A >

1 
h
1 + 

1 +  


1 
i

=xt
: (39)
This says that for given xt a su¢ciently large level-change in the agricultural technology A
can cause the immediate activation of quality innovation if it causes the threshold xZ to fall
below xt.
3.5 Summary
We can summarize our main global dynamics result as follows.
Proposition 1 Given (24) and x0 < xN < xZ, the economy begins in the pre-industrial era
with no innovation of any kind. It then experiences the endogenous takeo¤ and enters the
rst phase of the industrial era where horizontal innovation alone fuels industrial growth.
Finally, the economy enters the second phase of the industrial era with both vertical and
horizontal innovation and converges to the balanced growth path. Agricultural productivity
A determines the timing of the two-phase transitions but does not a¤ect the steady-state
growth rate of the economy. Specically, economies with higher agricultural productivity take
o¤ earlier and exhibit temporarily faster post-takeo¤ growth than economies with lower A,
eventually converging to the scale-invariant growth rate g.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
These properties are important when looking at the data. As mentioned, economies with
large populations (e.g., China, India) failed to industrialize for decades after smaller ones
did (e.g., UK, USA). Growth theories based on increasing returns have obvious problems
explaining this fact. The typical argument is that they had bad institutions (e.g., Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2012). Our analysis says that their reliance on a large, relatively unproductive
agricultural sector played an important role in determining their industrialization lags both
in term of the timing of the takeo¤ and of the steepness of the post-takeo¤ income prole.
The scale-invariance of steady-state growth implies that while agricultural productivity does
not a¤ect income growth asymptotically, it has permanent and large e¤ects on the overall
time-prole of income.
4 Quantitative analysis
In the early 19th century, the agricultural share of the US workforce decreased from about
80% to 60%.7 We perform a counterfactual analysis to assess how large an e¤ect this real-
location of labor from agriculture to industry had on the takeo¤ of the US economy.
Recall that rm size, which determines the timing of the takeo¤, is
xtly;t = xt(1  lq;t),
where lq;t  Lq;t=Lt is the agricultural labor share. The takeo¤ occurs when xt reaches the
threshold xN . In terms of rm size we have
xtly;t > xN l

y:
A decrease in the agricultural labor share lq;t from 80% to 60% yields an increase in the
industrial labor share ly;t from 20% to 40%.
8 This expands rm size xtly;t by a factor of 2
for given xt. In the pre-industrial era the state variable xt grows at rate . In the US, the
long-run population growth rate is 1.8%.9 Therefore, without the increase in the industrial
labor share, xt would take
t =
ln 2

=
0:7
1:8%
= 39 years
to increase by a factor of 2. In other words, without the reallocation of labor from agriculture
to industry in the early 19th century, the takeo¤ of the US economy would have been delayed
7See Baten (2016), Lebergott (1966) and Weiss (1986).
8Here we are putting manufacturing and services together as the industrial sector that requires innovation;
see e.g., United Nations (2011) for a review on the importance of innovation in the services sector. Kongsamut
et al. (2001) show that manufacturing and services require the same technology growth rate in order for a
balanced growth path to exist in their model.
9Data source: Maddison Project Database. The waiting time to takeo¤ is lower if the population growth
rate is higher.
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by about four decades. Furthermore, we can dene   dly;t=ly;t, i.e., the percent change in
ly;t, and for  small obtain the approximation
t =
ln(1 + )




years.
This says that, given a population growth rate  of 1.8%, a one-fth increase in industrial
employment reduces the wait time to takeo¤ by about a decade.
We now calibrate the rest of the model to data in the US economy in order to perform a
quantitative analysis. In addition to the population growth rate , the model also features
the following parameters: f; ; ; ; ; ; ; g.10 We set the discount rate  to a conventional
value of 0.05. We follow Iacopetta et al. (2019) to set the degree of technology spillovers
1    to 0.833 and the social return of variety  to 0.25. Then, we calibrate  using the
current agricultural share of GDP in the US, which is about 1%.11 Furthermore, we calibrate
f; ; g by matching the following moments of the US economy: 60% for the labor income
share of GDP, 62% for the consumption share of GDP, and 1% for the long-run growth
rate. Finally, we calibrate the markup ratio  by matching the average growth rates of the
simulated path from our model and the historical path in the US. The calibrated parameter
values are f; ; ; ; g = f0:016; 0:404; 2:547; 1:212; 1:630g.
To explore how well our model matches the historical path of the growth rate in the US,
we rst use historical data to calibrate a time path for the subsistence ratio =A. Specically,
we calibrate the initial value of =A using an agricultural labor share of 80% at the beginning
of the 19th century; see Baten (2016). Then, we use an agricultural labor share of 60% in
1840 and 53% in 1860 in Lebergott (1966) and Weiss (1986) and also an agricultural share
of GDP of 30% in 1900, 20% in 1920-1930, 10% in 1950 and 2% in 1980 in Kongsamut et
al. (2001) to compute a piecewise linear path of =A. We model these changes in A as MIT
shocks (i.e., a sequence of unanticipated, permanent changes). Based on this imputed path
of =A, Figure 2 simulates the path of the agricultural share of GDP, which decreases from
about 70% in the early 19th century to 1% at the end of the 20th century as in the US data.
Figure 3 presents the simulated path of the growth rate of industrial output per worker
and the HP-lter trend of the US growth rate12 along with a simulated path of the growth
rate without agricultural improvement (i.e., =A remains at its initial value). Here we pick
an initial value x0 such that the takeo¤ of the economy occurs before the mid-19th century.
Following the occurrence of horizontal innovation, vertical innovation also starts to happen
half a decade later. After that the economy keeps growing and reaches a growth rate as high
as 3% due to the expansion of the industrial sector, which helps to accelerate the rate of
innovation. Around the time of the Great Depression in the 20th century, there is a pause
in the reallocation of labor from agriculture to the industrial sector, which translates into a
temporary slow down in technological progress before a recovery. Before the end of the 20th
century, the growth rate of the economy gradually falls towards the long-run growth rate
due to the deceleration of sectoral reallocation. This simulated pattern replicates the data
reasonably well with the average growth rate increasing from 1.08% in the 19th century to
10There is also the subsistence ratio =A, which we will calibrate using historical data.
11Here we assume that the subsistence requirement is no longer binding in modern days; i.e., =A! 0.
12Unfortunately, we dont have historical data on labor productivity growth in the US, so we use data on
the growth rate of output per capita as a proxy.
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2.24% in the 20th century before decreasing to 1.04% in the 21st century, whereas the corre-
sponding data are 1.20%, 2.12% and 1.13% in the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries respectively.
In contrast, the simulated path of the growth rate without agricultural improvement cannot
capture this inverted-U pattern in the data.
Figure 2: Agricultural share of GDP Figure 3: Economic growth
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a Schumpeterian growth model with an agricultural sector
in which the size of rms in the industrial sector determines the endogenous takeo¤ of the
economy. The primary goal of the exercise is to shed new light on the important role of
agriculture in a dynamic process that historians describe narratively as follows (e.g., Nurkse
1953): at the heart of industrialization, large improvements in agricultural productivity lib-
erate labor from food production and reallocate it to industrial production. The secondary
goal is to shed new light on the role of agriculture in explaining why countries with large
populations, such as China and India, did not experience an early industrial takeo¤. Our ex-
planation is that the vast majority of their population being in agriculture did not contribute
to rm size in the industrial sector. The model delivers analytical insights on the mechanism
through which how an agricultural revolution determines the timing of the endogenous take-
o¤. A sectoral reallocation that expands rm size in the industrial sector produces an earlier
transition from stagnation to growth. Our quantitative analysis indicates that the decline
in the agricultural share of the US workforce in the early 19th century contributed to the
takeo¤ of the US economy. Without the reallocation of labor from agriculture to industry,
the takeo¤ of the US economy would have been delayed by four decades.
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Appendix A
Equilibrium. The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fat; qt; ct; Yt; Xt; It; Ly;t; Lq;tg
and prices frt; wt; pt; Pt; Vtg such that:
 the household consumes fqt; ctg to maximize utility taking frt; wt; ptg as given;
 competitive rms produce Qt to maximize prots taking fwt; ptg as given;
 competitive rms produce Yt to maximize prots taking fwt; Ptg as given;
 monopolistic intermediate-good rms choose fPt; Itg to maximize Vt taking rt as given;
 entrants make entry decisions taking Vt as given;
 the aggregate value of monopolistic rms equals the households wealth, atLt = NtVt;
 the labor market clears, Lq;t + Ly;t = Lt;
 the market for the agricultural good clears, qtLt = ALq;t;
 the market for the industrial good clears, Yt = ctLt +Nt (Xt + Zt + It) + _NtXt.
Dynamic optimization of monopolistic rms. The current-value Hamiltonian for mo-
nopolistic rm i is
Ht (i) = t (i)  It (i) + t (i) _Zt (i) + t (i) [  Pt (i)] , (A1)
where t (i) is the multiplier on Pt (i)  . We substitute (9)-(11) into (A1) and derive
@Ht (i)
@Pt (i)
= 0)
@t (i)
@Pt (i)
= t (i) , (A2)
@Ht (i)
@It (i)
= 0) t (i) = 1, (A3)
@Ht (i)
@Zt (i)
= 
(
[Pt (i)  1]


Pt (i)
1=(1 )
Ly;t
N1 t
  
)
Z 1t (i)Z
1 
t = rtt (i) 
_t (i) . (A4)
If Pt (i) < , then t (i) = 0. In this case, @t (i) =@Pt (i) = 0 yields Pt (i) = 1=. If the
constraint on Pt (i) is binding, then t (i) > 0. In this case, we have Pt (i) = . Therefore,
we have proven (13). Then, the assumption  < 1= implies Pt (i) = . Substituting (A3),
(14) and Pt (i) =  into (A4) and imposing symmetry yield (15), where ly;t  Ly;t=Lt.
Monopolistic prot in the pre-industrial era. In the pre-industrial era, the rm size
xtly;t is so small that monopolistic rms with increasing returns technology cannot earn a
positive prot; i.e.,
xtly;t < 
1=(1 )=(  1), t < 0,
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where ly is given in (28). In this case, the existing intermediate goods N0 are produced by
competitive rms that make zero prot. When xtly reaches 
1=(1 )=(   1), we assume
that the increasing returns technology is not yet deployed until xt reaches xN ; see Appendix
B for the case without this assumption.
Dynamics of the consumption-output ratio in the industrial era. The value of assets
owned by each member of the household is
at = VtNt=Lt. (A5)
If nt > 0, then Vt = Xt in (17) holds. Substituting (17) and XtNt = Yt into (A5) yields
at = XtNt=Lt = (=) Yt=Lt = (=) yt, (A6)
which implies that at=yt is constant. Substituting (A6), (3) and (8) into (2) yields
_yt
yt
=
_at
at
= rt   +
wtly;t + wtlq;t   ct   ptqt
at
=
_ct
ct
+   +
(1  )

 


ct
yt
, (A7)
where we have also used wtLq;t = ptQt. Equation (A7) can be rearranged as
_ct
ct
 
_yt
yt
=


ct
yt
 
(1  )

  (  ) , (A8)
which shows that the dynamics of ct=yt is characterized by saddle-point stability such that
ct=yt jumps to its steady-state value in (30) whenever nt > 0. Then, substituting (30) into
(22) yields ly in (31).
Proof of Proposition 1. In the pre-industrial era, the rm size xtly is not su¢ciently large
for horizontal and vertical innovation to be viable such that the variety growth rate and the
quality growth rate are both zero (i.e., nt = zt = 0). In this case, the industrial labor share
ly is given by (28) and the state variable xt = 
1=(1 )Lt=N
1 
0 increases at the population
growth rate . Therefore, in the pre-industrial era, the dynamics of xt is simply
_xt = xt > 0. (A9)
In the rst phase of the industrial era, the rm size xtl

y becomes su¢ciently large for
horizontal innovation (but not vertical innovation) to be viable such that nt > 0 and zt = 0.
In this case, the variety growth rate nt is given by (32), which is positive if and only if
xt >
1=(1 )=ly
  1  (  )
 xN > x0, (A10)
where ly is given by (31) and increasing in A. Given x0, the state variable xt increases at
the rate  until it reaches xN ; therefore, the time this process takes is
TN =
1

log

xN
x0

.
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After reaching xN , the dynamics of xt in (23) becomes
_xt = [  (1  )nt]xt =
1  


1=(1 )
ly
 

  1  

+

1  

xt

> 0, (A11)
which uses (32) for nt.
In the second phase of the industrial era, the rm size xtl

y becomes su¢ciently large for
both horizontal and vertical innovation to be viable such that nt > 0 and zt > 0. In this
case, the quality growth rate zt is positive if and only if
xt >


ly
 xZ > xN , (A12)
where ly is given by (31) and the composite parameter 
 is dened as before:

  arg
!
solve

  1
1=(1 )
!   
 
 
1=(1 )
!

=    (  )

.
In this regime, the equilibrium growth rate in (36) is derived from gt = r
q
t   , where r
q
t
is given in (15). Then, we use (36), (37) and zt = gt   nt to derive nt and the linearized
dynamics of xt as
_xt =
1  


(1  ) 

+

1  

1=(1 )
ly
 

(1  ) (  1)  

+

1  

xt

 0,
(A13)
where we have used 1=(1 )=
 
xtl

y

= 0. Then, we can use nt to derive zt = gt   nt.
Given (24), the autonomous dynamics of xt is stable and captured by (A9), (A11) and
(A13). Given an initial value x0, the state variable xt increases according to (A9) until xt
reaches the rst threshold xN , which is decreasing in A via l

y. Then, xt increases according to
(A11) until xt reaches the second threshold xZ , which is also decreasing in A via l

y. Finally,
xt increases according to (A13) until xt converges to its steady state
x =
1=(1 )
ly
(1  )  [+ =(1  )]
(1  )(  1)   [+ =(1  )]
, (A14)
where ly is given in (31).
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Appendix B
In this appendix, we extend the baseline model to allow for the possibility that in the
pre-industrial era (i.e., nt = zt = 0), monopolistic prots become positive (i.e., t > 0)
before the takeo¤ occurs. When nt = 0, the entry condition in (17) does not hold. However,
the asset-pricing equation in (16) still holds and becomes
rt =
t
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
, (B1)
where It = zt = 0. We use (A5) and nt = 0 to derive _at=at = _Vt=Vt    and then substitute
this equation into (2) to obtain
_Vt
Vt
   =
_at
at
= rt   +
wtly;t + wtlq;t   ptqt   ct
at
. (B2)
Substituting (B1) into (B2) yields
ct =
t
Vt
at + wtly;t =
Nt
Lt
t + (1  ) yt, (B3)
where we have used (A5), wtlq;t = ptqt and wtly;t = (1  ) yt. Then, substituting (11) and
Pt =  into (B3) yields
ct =
NtXt (  1  Zt=Xt)
Lt
+(1  ) yt = 
=(1 )

  1
1=(1 )
 

xtly;t

yt+(1  ) yt, (B4)
where the second equality uses Yt = NtXt and (14). The consumption-output ratio is
ct
yt
= =(1 )

  1
1=(1 )
 

xtly;t

+ 1  , (B5)
which would increase from (27) to (30) if the rm size xtly;t increases from 
1=(1 )=(  1)
to 1=(1 )=[   1   (   )]. Finally, we substitute (B5) into (22) and manipulate the
equation to obtain the equilibrium rm size:
xtly;t =

1 
=(1 ) +
 
1  
A

xt
1 + 

1 + 
1 
 1

 , (B6)
which continues to be increasing in the level of agricultural technology A.
Given that the dynamics of xt is still given by (A9) in the pre-industrial era, the rm
size xtly;t gradually increases towards the threshold in (A10) to trigger the takeo¤ as before.
The only di¤erence is that as xt increases overtime, ly;t in (B6) is gradually decreasing from
ly in (28) to l

y in (31) (instead of jumping from ly to l

y at the time of the takeo¤). This
additional dynamics in ly;t gives rise to negative growth in the industrial output per capita
before the takeo¤, which is less realistic than the dynamics in the baseline model.
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